provider

IdentityAssertionParams

Bases: BaseModel

Validated parameters of a SEP-990 identity-assertion (RFC 7523 jwt-bearer) request.

Passed to OAuthAuthorizationServerProvider.exchange_identity_assertion. assertion is the ID-JAG (a signed JWT) the enterprise identity provider issued; the provider validates it per RFC 7523 §3 and the SEP-990 §5.1 processing rules before issuing an access token.

Source code in src/mcp/server/auth/provider.py

class IdentityAssertionParams(BaseModel):
    """Validated parameters of a SEP-990 identity-assertion (RFC 7523 jwt-bearer) request.

    Passed to ``OAuthAuthorizationServerProvider.exchange_identity_assertion``. ``assertion`` is the
    ID-JAG (a signed JWT) the enterprise identity provider issued; the provider validates it per
    RFC 7523 §3 and the SEP-990 §5.1 processing rules before issuing an access token.
    """

    assertion: str  # RFC 7523 §2.1: the JWT (ID-JAG) presented as the authorization grant
    scopes: list[str] | None = None
    resource: str | None = None  # RFC 8707 resource indicator from the token request

principal_components

principal_components(
    token: AccessToken,
) -> tuple[str, str | None, str | None]

The (client_id, issuer, subject) triple identifying the principal a token represents.

The single source for "who is this token's principal": session ownership and request-state binding both build on it. Components the token verifier does not supply are None, so comparisons degrade to the remaining components.

Source code in src/mcp/server/auth/provider.py

def principal_components(token: AccessToken) -> tuple[str, str | None, str | None]:
    """The (client_id, issuer, subject) triple identifying the principal a token represents.

    The single source for "who is this token's principal": session ownership and
    request-state binding both build on it. Components the token verifier does
    not supply are `None`, so comparisons degrade to the remaining components.
    """
    issuer = (token.claims or {}).get("iss")
    return token.client_id, str(issuer) if issuer is not None else None, token.subject

TokenVerifier

Bases: Protocol

Protocol for verifying bearer tokens.

Source code in src/mcp/server/auth/provider.py

class TokenVerifier(Protocol):
    """Protocol for verifying bearer tokens."""

    async def verify_token(self, token: str) -> AccessToken | None:
        """Verify a bearer token and return access info if valid."""

verify_token `async`

verify_token(token: str) -> AccessToken | None

Verify a bearer token and return access info if valid.

Source code in src/mcp/server/auth/provider.py

async def verify_token(self, token: str) -> AccessToken | None:
    """Verify a bearer token and return access info if valid."""

OAuthAuthorizationServerProvider

Bases: Protocol, Generic[AuthorizationCodeT, RefreshTokenT, AccessTokenT]

Source code in src/mcp/server/auth/provider.py

class OAuthAuthorizationServerProvider(Protocol, Generic[AuthorizationCodeT, RefreshTokenT, AccessTokenT]):
    async def get_client(self, client_id: str) -> OAuthClientInformationFull | None:
        """Retrieves client information by client ID.

        Implementors MAY raise NotImplementedError if dynamic client registration is
        disabled in ClientRegistrationOptions.

        Args:
            client_id: The ID of the client to retrieve.

        Returns:
            The client information, or None if the client does not exist.
        """

    async def register_client(self, client_info: OAuthClientInformationFull) -> None:
        """Saves client information as part of registering it.

        Implementors MAY raise NotImplementedError if dynamic client registration is
        disabled in ClientRegistrationOptions.

        Args:
            client_info: The client metadata to register.

        Raises:
            RegistrationError: If the client metadata is invalid.
        """

    async def authorize(self, client: OAuthClientInformationFull, params: AuthorizationParams) -> str:
        """Handle the /authorize endpoint and return a URL that the client
        will be redirected to.

        Many MCP implementations will redirect to a third-party provider to perform
        a second OAuth exchange with that provider. In this sort of setup, the client
        has an OAuth connection with the MCP server, and the MCP server has an OAuth
        connection with the 3rd-party provider. At the end of this flow, the client
        should be redirected to the redirect_uri from params.redirect_uri.

        +--------+     +------------+     +-------------------+
        |        |     |            |     |                   |
        | Client | --> | MCP Server | --> | 3rd Party OAuth   |
        |        |     |            |     | Server            |
        +--------+     +------------+     +-------------------+
                            |   ^                  |
        +------------+      |   |                  |
        |            |      |   |    Redirect      |
        |redirect_uri|<-----+   +------------------+
        |            |
        +------------+

        Implementations will need to define another handler on the MCP server's return
        flow to perform the second redirect, and generate and store an authorization
        code as part of completing the OAuth authorization step.

        Implementations SHOULD generate an authorization code with at least 160 bits of
        entropy,
        and MUST generate an authorization code with at least 128 bits of entropy.
        See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-10.10.

        Args:
            client: The client requesting authorization.
            params: The parameters of the authorization request.

        Returns:
            A URL to redirect the client to for authorization.

        Raises:
            AuthorizeError: If the authorization request is invalid.
        """
        ...

    async def load_authorization_code(
        self, client: OAuthClientInformationFull, authorization_code: str
    ) -> AuthorizationCodeT | None:
        """Loads an AuthorizationCode by its code.

        Args:
            client: The client that requested the authorization code.
            authorization_code: The authorization code to get the challenge for.

        Returns:
            The AuthorizationCode, or None if not found.
        """
        ...

    async def exchange_authorization_code(
        self, client: OAuthClientInformationFull, authorization_code: AuthorizationCodeT
    ) -> OAuthToken:
        """Exchanges an authorization code for an access token and refresh token.

        Args:
            client: The client exchanging the authorization code.
            authorization_code: The authorization code to exchange.

        Returns:
            The OAuth token, containing access and refresh tokens.

        Raises:
            TokenError: If the request is invalid.
        """
        ...

    async def load_refresh_token(self, client: OAuthClientInformationFull, refresh_token: str) -> RefreshTokenT | None:
        """Loads a RefreshToken by its token string.

        Args:
            client: The client that is requesting to load the refresh token.
            refresh_token: The refresh token string to load.

        Returns:
            The RefreshToken object if found, or None if not found.
        """
        ...

    async def exchange_refresh_token(
        self,
        client: OAuthClientInformationFull,
        refresh_token: RefreshTokenT,
        scopes: list[str],
    ) -> OAuthToken:
        """Exchanges a refresh token for an access token and refresh token.

        Implementations SHOULD rotate both the access token and refresh token.

        Args:
            client: The client exchanging the refresh token.
            refresh_token: The refresh token to exchange.
            scopes: Optional scopes to request with the new access token.

        Returns:
            The OAuth token, containing access and refresh tokens.

        Raises:
            TokenError: If the request is invalid.
        """
        ...

    async def load_access_token(self, token: str) -> AccessTokenT | None:
        """Loads an access token by its token string.

        Args:
            token: The access token to verify.

        Returns:
            The access token, or None if the token is invalid.
        """

    async def revoke_token(
        self,
        token: AccessTokenT | RefreshTokenT,
    ) -> None:
        """Revokes an access or refresh token.

        If the given token is invalid or already revoked, this method should do nothing.

        Implementations SHOULD revoke both the access token and its corresponding
        refresh token, regardless of which of the access token or refresh token is
        provided.

        Args:
            token: The token to revoke.
        """

    async def exchange_identity_assertion(
        self,
        client: OAuthClientInformationFull,
        params: IdentityAssertionParams,
    ) -> OAuthToken:
        """Exchanges an Identity Assertion Authorization Grant (ID-JAG) for an access token.

        This is leg 2 of SEP-990: the client presents an ID-JAG - issued by the enterprise
        identity provider - using the RFC 7523 ``urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer``
        grant, and receives an access token for this MCP server. The default implementation
        rejects every request as an unsupported grant type; override it to enable the grant.

        The implementation is responsible for validating ``params.assertion`` per RFC 7523 §3
        and the SEP-990 §5.1 processing rules, in particular:

        - verify the JWT signature, ``iss``, and ``exp``, and that ``typ`` is ``oauth-id-jag+jwt``;
        - require ``aud`` to identify this authorization server (its own issuer);
        - require a ``sub`` (RFC 7523 §3 makes it mandatory) identifying the end user;
        - reject replays - enforce ``exp``, and track ``jti`` for the assertion's lifetime;
        - require the ID-JAG's ``client_id`` claim to match the authenticated ``client`` - do
          NOT derive authorization from ``client.client_id`` alone, which for a confidential
          client is authenticated but for any client is ultimately self-asserted in the request;
        - audience-restrict the issued access token to the resource named in the ID-JAG's
          ``resource`` claim, not merely ``params.resource`` (which the client controls);
        - derive the granted scopes from the ID-JAG and policy rather than granting
          ``params.scopes`` verbatim.

        The handler guarantees ``client`` is confidential (it rejects clients without a stored
        secret before calling this hook), but the ID-JAG remains the authoritative grant.

        Args:
            client: The authenticated client presenting the assertion.
            params: The validated jwt-bearer request parameters (the ID-JAG and indicators).

        Returns:
            The OAuth token, containing the issued access token. A refresh token SHOULD NOT be
            issued: SEP-990 relies on the IdP to control session lifetime via re-issued ID-JAGs.

        Raises:
            TokenError: If the assertion or request is invalid. Use ``invalid_grant`` for a
                rejected assertion and ``invalid_target`` for an unknown ``resource``.
        """
        raise TokenError(
            error="unsupported_grant_type",
            error_description="The JWT bearer grant is not supported by this authorization server",
        )

get_client `async`

get_client(
    client_id: str,
) -> OAuthClientInformationFull | None

Retrieves client information by client ID.

Implementors MAY raise NotImplementedError if dynamic client registration is disabled in ClientRegistrationOptions.

Parameters:

Name	Type	Description	Default
`client_id`	`str`	The ID of the client to retrieve.	required

Returns:

Type	Description
`OAuthClientInformationFull \| None`	The client information, or None if the client does not exist.

Source code in src/mcp/server/auth/provider.py

async def get_client(self, client_id: str) -> OAuthClientInformationFull | None:
    """Retrieves client information by client ID.

    Implementors MAY raise NotImplementedError if dynamic client registration is
    disabled in ClientRegistrationOptions.

    Args:
        client_id: The ID of the client to retrieve.

    Returns:
        The client information, or None if the client does not exist.
    """

register_client `async`

register_client(
    client_info: OAuthClientInformationFull,
) -> None

Saves client information as part of registering it.

Implementors MAY raise NotImplementedError if dynamic client registration is disabled in ClientRegistrationOptions.

Parameters:

Name	Type	Description	Default
`client_info`	`OAuthClientInformationFull`	The client metadata to register.	required

Raises:

Type	Description
`RegistrationError`	If the client metadata is invalid.

Source code in src/mcp/server/auth/provider.py

async def register_client(self, client_info: OAuthClientInformationFull) -> None:
    """Saves client information as part of registering it.

    Implementors MAY raise NotImplementedError if dynamic client registration is
    disabled in ClientRegistrationOptions.

    Args:
        client_info: The client metadata to register.

    Raises:
        RegistrationError: If the client metadata is invalid.
    """

authorize `async`

authorize(
    client: OAuthClientInformationFull,
    params: AuthorizationParams,
) -> str

Handle the /authorize endpoint and return a URL that the client will be redirected to.

Many MCP implementations will redirect to a third-party provider to perform a second OAuth exchange with that provider. In this sort of setup, the client has an OAuth connection with the MCP server, and the MCP server has an OAuth connection with the 3rd-party provider. At the end of this flow, the client should be redirected to the redirect_uri from params.redirect_uri.

+--------+ +------------+ +-------------------+ | | | | | | | Client | --> | MCP Server | --> | 3rd Party OAuth | | | | | | Server | +--------+ +------------+ +-------------------+ | ^ | +------------+ | | | | | | | Redirect | |redirect_uri|<-----+ +------------------+ | | +------------+

Implementations will need to define another handler on the MCP server's return flow to perform the second redirect, and generate and store an authorization code as part of completing the OAuth authorization step.

Implementations SHOULD generate an authorization code with at least 160 bits of entropy, and MUST generate an authorization code with at least 128 bits of entropy. See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-10.10.

Parameters:

Name	Type	Description	Default
`client`	`OAuthClientInformationFull`	The client requesting authorization.	required
`params`	`AuthorizationParams`	The parameters of the authorization request.	required

Returns:

Type	Description
`str`	A URL to redirect the client to for authorization.

Raises:

Type	Description
`AuthorizeError`	If the authorization request is invalid.

Source code in src/mcp/server/auth/provider.py

async def authorize(self, client: OAuthClientInformationFull, params: AuthorizationParams) -> str:
    """Handle the /authorize endpoint and return a URL that the client
    will be redirected to.

    Many MCP implementations will redirect to a third-party provider to perform
    a second OAuth exchange with that provider. In this sort of setup, the client
    has an OAuth connection with the MCP server, and the MCP server has an OAuth
    connection with the 3rd-party provider. At the end of this flow, the client
    should be redirected to the redirect_uri from params.redirect_uri.

    +--------+     +------------+     +-------------------+
    |        |     |            |     |                   |
    | Client | --> | MCP Server | --> | 3rd Party OAuth   |
    |        |     |            |     | Server            |
    +--------+     +------------+     +-------------------+
                        |   ^                  |
    +------------+      |   |                  |
    |            |      |   |    Redirect      |
    |redirect_uri|<-----+   +------------------+
    |            |
    +------------+

    Implementations will need to define another handler on the MCP server's return
    flow to perform the second redirect, and generate and store an authorization
    code as part of completing the OAuth authorization step.

    Implementations SHOULD generate an authorization code with at least 160 bits of
    entropy,
    and MUST generate an authorization code with at least 128 bits of entropy.
    See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-10.10.

    Args:
        client: The client requesting authorization.
        params: The parameters of the authorization request.

    Returns:
        A URL to redirect the client to for authorization.

    Raises:
        AuthorizeError: If the authorization request is invalid.
    """
    ...

load_authorization_code `async`

load_authorization_code(
    client: OAuthClientInformationFull,
    authorization_code: str,
) -> AuthorizationCodeT | None

Loads an AuthorizationCode by its code.

Parameters:

Name	Type	Description	Default
`client`	`OAuthClientInformationFull`	The client that requested the authorization code.	required
`authorization_code`	`str`	The authorization code to get the challenge for.	required

Returns:

Type	Description
`AuthorizationCodeT \| None`	The AuthorizationCode, or None if not found.

Source code in src/mcp/server/auth/provider.py

async def load_authorization_code(
    self, client: OAuthClientInformationFull, authorization_code: str
) -> AuthorizationCodeT | None:
    """Loads an AuthorizationCode by its code.

    Args:
        client: The client that requested the authorization code.
        authorization_code: The authorization code to get the challenge for.

    Returns:
        The AuthorizationCode, or None if not found.
    """
    ...

exchange_authorization_code `async`

exchange_authorization_code(
    client: OAuthClientInformationFull,
    authorization_code: AuthorizationCodeT,
) -> OAuthToken

Exchanges an authorization code for an access token and refresh token.

Parameters:

Name	Type	Description	Default
`client`	`OAuthClientInformationFull`	The client exchanging the authorization code.	required
`authorization_code`	`AuthorizationCodeT`	The authorization code to exchange.	required

Returns:

Type	Description
`OAuthToken`	The OAuth token, containing access and refresh tokens.

Raises:

Type	Description
`TokenError`	If the request is invalid.

Source code in src/mcp/server/auth/provider.py

async def exchange_authorization_code(
    self, client: OAuthClientInformationFull, authorization_code: AuthorizationCodeT
) -> OAuthToken:
    """Exchanges an authorization code for an access token and refresh token.

    Args:
        client: The client exchanging the authorization code.
        authorization_code: The authorization code to exchange.

    Returns:
        The OAuth token, containing access and refresh tokens.

    Raises:
        TokenError: If the request is invalid.
    """
    ...

load_refresh_token `async`

load_refresh_token(
    client: OAuthClientInformationFull, refresh_token: str
) -> RefreshTokenT | None

Loads a RefreshToken by its token string.

Parameters:

Name	Type	Description	Default
`client`	`OAuthClientInformationFull`	The client that is requesting to load the refresh token.	required
`refresh_token`	`str`	The refresh token string to load.	required

Returns:

Type	Description
`RefreshTokenT \| None`	The RefreshToken object if found, or None if not found.

Source code in src/mcp/server/auth/provider.py

async def load_refresh_token(self, client: OAuthClientInformationFull, refresh_token: str) -> RefreshTokenT | None:
    """Loads a RefreshToken by its token string.

    Args:
        client: The client that is requesting to load the refresh token.
        refresh_token: The refresh token string to load.

    Returns:
        The RefreshToken object if found, or None if not found.
    """
    ...

exchange_refresh_token `async`

exchange_refresh_token(
    client: OAuthClientInformationFull,
    refresh_token: RefreshTokenT,
    scopes: list[str],
) -> OAuthToken

Exchanges a refresh token for an access token and refresh token.

Implementations SHOULD rotate both the access token and refresh token.

Parameters:

Name	Type	Description	Default
`client`	`OAuthClientInformationFull`	The client exchanging the refresh token.	required
`refresh_token`	`RefreshTokenT`	The refresh token to exchange.	required
`scopes`	`list[str]`	Optional scopes to request with the new access token.	required

Returns:

Type	Description
`OAuthToken`	The OAuth token, containing access and refresh tokens.

Raises:

Type	Description
`TokenError`	If the request is invalid.

Source code in src/mcp/server/auth/provider.py

async def exchange_refresh_token(
    self,
    client: OAuthClientInformationFull,
    refresh_token: RefreshTokenT,
    scopes: list[str],
) -> OAuthToken:
    """Exchanges a refresh token for an access token and refresh token.

    Implementations SHOULD rotate both the access token and refresh token.

    Args:
        client: The client exchanging the refresh token.
        refresh_token: The refresh token to exchange.
        scopes: Optional scopes to request with the new access token.

    Returns:
        The OAuth token, containing access and refresh tokens.

    Raises:
        TokenError: If the request is invalid.
    """
    ...

load_access_token `async`

load_access_token(token: str) -> AccessTokenT | None

Loads an access token by its token string.

Parameters:

Name	Type	Description	Default
`token`	`str`	The access token to verify.	required

Returns:

Type	Description
`AccessTokenT \| None`	The access token, or None if the token is invalid.

Source code in src/mcp/server/auth/provider.py

async def load_access_token(self, token: str) -> AccessTokenT | None:
    """Loads an access token by its token string.

    Args:
        token: The access token to verify.

    Returns:
        The access token, or None if the token is invalid.
    """

revoke_token `async`

revoke_token(token: AccessTokenT | RefreshTokenT) -> None

Revokes an access or refresh token.

If the given token is invalid or already revoked, this method should do nothing.

Implementations SHOULD revoke both the access token and its corresponding refresh token, regardless of which of the access token or refresh token is provided.

Parameters:

Name	Type	Description	Default
`token`	`AccessTokenT \| RefreshTokenT`	The token to revoke.	required

Source code in src/mcp/server/auth/provider.py

async def revoke_token(
    self,
    token: AccessTokenT | RefreshTokenT,
) -> None:
    """Revokes an access or refresh token.

    If the given token is invalid or already revoked, this method should do nothing.

    Implementations SHOULD revoke both the access token and its corresponding
    refresh token, regardless of which of the access token or refresh token is
    provided.

    Args:
        token: The token to revoke.
    """

exchange_identity_assertion `async`

exchange_identity_assertion(
    client: OAuthClientInformationFull,
    params: IdentityAssertionParams,
) -> OAuthToken

Exchanges an Identity Assertion Authorization Grant (ID-JAG) for an access token.

This is leg 2 of SEP-990: the client presents an ID-JAG - issued by the enterprise identity provider - using the RFC 7523 urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer grant, and receives an access token for this MCP server. The default implementation rejects every request as an unsupported grant type; override it to enable the grant.

The implementation is responsible for validating params.assertion per RFC 7523 §3 and the SEP-990 §5.1 processing rules, in particular:

verify the JWT signature, iss, and exp, and that typ is oauth-id-jag+jwt;
require aud to identify this authorization server (its own issuer);
require a sub (RFC 7523 §3 makes it mandatory) identifying the end user;
reject replays - enforce exp, and track jti for the assertion's lifetime;
require the ID-JAG's client_id claim to match the authenticated client - do NOT derive authorization from client.client_id alone, which for a confidential client is authenticated but for any client is ultimately self-asserted in the request;
audience-restrict the issued access token to the resource named in the ID-JAG's resource claim, not merely params.resource (which the client controls);
derive the granted scopes from the ID-JAG and policy rather than granting params.scopes verbatim.

The handler guarantees client is confidential (it rejects clients without a stored secret before calling this hook), but the ID-JAG remains the authoritative grant.

Parameters:

Name	Type	Description	Default
`client`	`OAuthClientInformationFull`	The authenticated client presenting the assertion.	required
`params`	`IdentityAssertionParams`	The validated jwt-bearer request parameters (the ID-JAG and indicators).	required

Returns:

Name	Type	Description
	`OAuthToken`	The OAuth token, containing the issued access token. A refresh token SHOULD NOT be
`issued`	`OAuthToken`	SEP-990 relies on the IdP to control session lifetime via re-issued ID-JAGs.

Raises:

Type	Description
`TokenError`	If the assertion or request is invalid. Use `invalid_grant` for a rejected assertion and `invalid_target` for an unknown `resource`.

Source code in src/mcp/server/auth/provider.py

async def exchange_identity_assertion(
    self,
    client: OAuthClientInformationFull,
    params: IdentityAssertionParams,
) -> OAuthToken:
    """Exchanges an Identity Assertion Authorization Grant (ID-JAG) for an access token.

    This is leg 2 of SEP-990: the client presents an ID-JAG - issued by the enterprise
    identity provider - using the RFC 7523 ``urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer``
    grant, and receives an access token for this MCP server. The default implementation
    rejects every request as an unsupported grant type; override it to enable the grant.

    The implementation is responsible for validating ``params.assertion`` per RFC 7523 §3
    and the SEP-990 §5.1 processing rules, in particular:

    - verify the JWT signature, ``iss``, and ``exp``, and that ``typ`` is ``oauth-id-jag+jwt``;
    - require ``aud`` to identify this authorization server (its own issuer);
    - require a ``sub`` (RFC 7523 §3 makes it mandatory) identifying the end user;
    - reject replays - enforce ``exp``, and track ``jti`` for the assertion's lifetime;
    - require the ID-JAG's ``client_id`` claim to match the authenticated ``client`` - do
      NOT derive authorization from ``client.client_id`` alone, which for a confidential
      client is authenticated but for any client is ultimately self-asserted in the request;
    - audience-restrict the issued access token to the resource named in the ID-JAG's
      ``resource`` claim, not merely ``params.resource`` (which the client controls);
    - derive the granted scopes from the ID-JAG and policy rather than granting
      ``params.scopes`` verbatim.

    The handler guarantees ``client`` is confidential (it rejects clients without a stored
    secret before calling this hook), but the ID-JAG remains the authoritative grant.

    Args:
        client: The authenticated client presenting the assertion.
        params: The validated jwt-bearer request parameters (the ID-JAG and indicators).

    Returns:
        The OAuth token, containing the issued access token. A refresh token SHOULD NOT be
        issued: SEP-990 relies on the IdP to control session lifetime via re-issued ID-JAGs.

    Raises:
        TokenError: If the assertion or request is invalid. Use ``invalid_grant`` for a
            rejected assertion and ``invalid_target`` for an unknown ``resource``.
    """
    raise TokenError(
        error="unsupported_grant_type",
        error_description="The JWT bearer grant is not supported by this authorization server",
    )

ProviderTokenVerifier

Bases: TokenVerifier

Token verifier that uses an OAuthAuthorizationServerProvider.

This is provided for backwards compatibility with existing auth_server_provider configurations. For new implementations using AS/RS separation, consider using the TokenVerifier protocol with a dedicated implementation like IntrospectionTokenVerifier.

Source code in src/mcp/server/auth/provider.py

class ProviderTokenVerifier(TokenVerifier):
    """Token verifier that uses an OAuthAuthorizationServerProvider.

    This is provided for backwards compatibility with existing auth_server_provider
    configurations. For new implementations using AS/RS separation, consider using
    the TokenVerifier protocol with a dedicated implementation like IntrospectionTokenVerifier.
    """

    def __init__(self, provider: "OAuthAuthorizationServerProvider[AuthorizationCode, RefreshToken, AccessToken]"):
        self.provider = provider

    async def verify_token(self, token: str) -> AccessToken | None:
        """Verify token using the provider's load_access_token method."""
        return await self.provider.load_access_token(token)

verify_token `async`

verify_token(token: str) -> AccessToken | None

Verify token using the provider's load_access_token method.

Source code in src/mcp/server/auth/provider.py

async def verify_token(self, token: str) -> AccessToken | None:
    """Verify token using the provider's load_access_token method."""
    return await self.provider.load_access_token(token)

provider

IdentityAssertionParams

principal_components

TokenVerifier

verify_token async

OAuthAuthorizationServerProvider

get_client async

register_client async

authorize async

load_authorization_code async

exchange_authorization_code async

load_refresh_token async

exchange_refresh_token async

load_access_token async

revoke_token async

exchange_identity_assertion async

ProviderTokenVerifier

verify_token async

verify_token `async`

get_client `async`

register_client `async`

authorize `async`

load_authorization_code `async`

exchange_authorization_code `async`

load_refresh_token `async`

exchange_refresh_token `async`

load_access_token `async`

revoke_token `async`

exchange_identity_assertion `async`

verify_token `async`